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Maria Polyakova

Assistant Professor of Health Research and Policy (Health Services Research)

Bio
Academic Appointments: 
Assistant Professor, Health Research & Policy
Education: 
Ph.D., MIT, Economics (2014)
B.A., Yale University, Economics & Mathematics (2008)
Research & Scholarship
Projects: 
Regulation of Insurance with Adverse Selection and Switching Costs: Evidence from Medicare Part D [submitted]
Title: 
Regulation of Insurance with Adverse Selection and Switching Costs: Evidence from Medicare Part D [submitted]
Detail: 

Location

Stanford

For More Information:

Can Private Insurers Fail to Cream-Skim the Public Option? Evidence from the German Individual Mandate [submitted]
Title: 
Can Private Insurers Fail to Cream-Skim the Public Option? Evidence from the German Individual Mandate [submitted]
Detail: 

Location

Stanford

For More Information:

Allocative Distortions in Medicare Part D (with Francesco Decarolis and Stephen Ryan)
Title: 
Allocative Distortions in Medicare Part D (with Francesco Decarolis and Stephen Ryan)
Detail: 

Location

Stanford

Teaching
Courses Taught: 
Academic Year: 
2017-18
Courses: 
Topics in Health Economics I
ECON 249, HRP 249, MED 249 (Spr)
Independent Study Courses: 
Academic Year: 
2016-17
Courses: 
Topics in Health Economics I
ECON 249, HRP 249, MED 249 (Aut)
Independent Study Courses: 
Medical Scholars Research
HRP 370 (Aut, Win)
Advisees: 
Publications
Risk selection and heterogeneous preferences in health insurance markets with a public option JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS Polyakova, M. 2016; 49: 153-168

Abstract

Conventional wisdom suggests that if private health insurance plans compete alongside a public option, they may endanger the latter's financial stability by cream-skimming good risks. This paper argues that two factors may contribute to the extent of cream-skimming: (i) degree of horizontal differentiation between public and private options when preferences are heterogeneous; (ii) whether contract design encourages choice of private insurance before information about risk is revealed. I explore the role of these factors empirically within the unique institutional setting of the German health insurance system. Using a fuzzy regression discontinuity design to disentangle adverse selection and moral hazard, I find no compelling support for extensive cream-skimming of public option by private insurers despite their ability to fully underwrite risk. A model of demand for private insurance supports the idea that heterogeneity in non-pecuniary preferences and long-term structure of private insurance contracts may be muting cream-skimming in this setting.

View details for DOI 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2016.06.012

View details for Web of Science ID 000384869400012

View details for PubMedID 27454199

Regulation of Insurance with Adverse Selection and Switching Costs: Evidence from Medicare Part D AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS Polyakova, M. 2016; 8 (3): 165-195